Analysis of the operational environment for air defence systems of joint task forces in stabilisation operations (based on the experience of the Russo-Ukrainian War and other contemporary conflicts)

Abstract

This paper examines the challenges of organising air defence (AD) during stabilisation operations, incorporating NATO doctrinal requirements and empirical data from the Russo-Ukrainian War (2022–2026). The authors provide a detailed analysis of the evolution of enemy aerial assault tactics, specifically the employment of combined missile and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) strikes, alongside the mass deployment of guided aerial bombs (GABs). A significant contribution of this research is the justification for transitioning towards a multi-layered air defense architecture that integrates missile systems, anti-aircraft artillery, and Electronic Warfare (EW) to address the 'cost-exchange ratio' dilemma. Furthermore, the study proposes specific measures to enhance system survivability through deception operations and the integration of civilian early-warning systems. The findings are pertinent for specialists focusing on contemporary hybrid threats and the protection of critical national infrastructure.