Implementing quantum-safe cryptography into network infrastructure

Abstract

As the era of quantum computing approaches, the fundamental cryptographic primitives securing global communications face a paradigm shift. With the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) finalizing new standards, the industry must urgently address the vulnerabilities of legacy systems. The imminent advent of CRQCs (Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computers) poses an existential threat to the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) underpinning the global digital economy. Classical algorithms such as RSA and ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) are vulnerable to polynomial-time cryptanalysis via Shor’s algorithm. This study investigates the HNDL (Harvest Now, Decrypt Later) threat model and evaluates the resilience of NIST-standardized PQC (Post-Quantum Cryptography) algorithms: ML-KEM and ML-DSA. Utilizing a high-performance Fortinet networking environment, we experimentally validate that "Hybrid Mode" IPsec VPNs can achieve quantum resistance with negligible performance degradation, offering a viable migration path for enterprise infrastructure. Specifically, we benchmark the trade-offs between PQC’s larger key sizes and network latency, demonstrating that the overhead remains within acceptable operational thresholds. Implementing hybrid protocols provides a critical transition mechanism, allowing organizations to secure long-term data confidentiality against retrospective decryption while preserving interoperability with legacy systems.