Economic assistance of the United States to the Republic of China (1946-1949)

Abstract

This article analyzes the economic assistance framework implemented by the United States toward the Republic of China (ROC) from 1946 to 1949. Driven by a containment doctrine, the U.S. sought to stabilize the Nationalist regime (Kuomintang) primarily through significant financial and material support, formalized by agreements such as the 1946 Treaty of Nanking, which also secured extensive U.S. economic privileges in China. The study evaluates the strategic decision to prioritize economic stabilization over direct military intervention. Findings demonstrate the inherent limitations of this approach; despite substantial aid allocations, the policy failed to overcome the fundamental political and military weaknesses of the Nationalist forces. The KMT’s eventual defeat, characterized by the 1949 "White Paper" as inevitable, confirmed the failure of this non-interventionist economic strategy, compelling a strategic shift toward the defense of Taiwan. The defeat of Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT’s retreat to Taiwan represented a major strategic setback for the United States.